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This paper examines the determinants of a multinational enterprise’s (MNEs) decision to set up tax
haven subsidiaries. We adapt the ﬁrm-speciﬁc advantage–country-speciﬁc advantage (FSA–CSA)
framework and construct a number of empirically testable hypotheses. The analysis is based on a
database covering 14,209 MNEs in twelve OECD countries. We ﬁnd that the variety of capitalism of a
MNEs home location and the level of technological intensity has a strong impact on this decision. We also
ﬁnd that the home country corporate tax rate has a minimal impact. This suggests that corporate tax
liberalisation is unlikely to deter MNEs from undertaking this activity.
ß 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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1. Introduction
The issue of corporate tax avoidance is high on the political
agenda, given the state of public ﬁnances in many countries,
particularly in the aftermath of the recent global ﬁnancial crisis of
2008. Recent media coverage concerning the tax affairs of some of
the world’s most notable multinational enterprises (MNEs) such as
Amazon, Apple, Google and Starbucks have created much hostility
from civil society, non-governmental organisations and the general
public. The Tax Justice Network1 has estimated that an accumulated
21–32 trillion US dollars has been invested virtually tax-free in the
world’s more than 80 offshore secrecy jurisdictions (Henry, 2012).
This has increased pressure on policy makers to take action.
In June 2012 the G20 explicitly referred to ‘the need to prevent
base erosion and proﬁt shifting’ (OECD, 2013). At the same time, this
concern was also voiced by US President Obama in the President’s
Framework for Business Tax Reform, which stated that ‘empirical
evidence suggests that the income-shifting behaviour by multinational corporations is a signiﬁcant concern that should be addressed
through tax reform’. At the G20 meeting in November 2012, George
Osborne, the UK’s Chancellor of the Exchequer and Wolfgang
Schäuble, Germany’s Finance Minister, issued a joint statement
calling for co-ordinated action to strengthen international tax
standards. In 2013, the leaders of the G8 met in Northern Ireland and
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The Tax Justice Network is an independent international network that undertakes
high level research into issues surrounding international tax and ﬁnancial regulation.
A particular focus of their work is on tax competition and offshore tax havens.

agreed new measures to deal with tax avoidance by allowing access
to each other’s information held on individual and company tax
affairs. These events led to publication of the BEPS Report which was
endorsed by the OECD council in May 2013 committing countries to
a comprehensive action plan to address these issues. The objective of
these policies is to create a system of global tax reform designed to
have a signiﬁcant impact upon MNE strategy in terms of taxation.
However, the issue of offshore tax haven activity has been on the
policy agenda for many decades and previous government
initiatives have so far been limited in their impact.
Tax havens allow MNEs to shift proﬁts out of high tax
jurisdictions into low tax jurisdictions, most commonly via
transfer pricing (Eden, 2009). They are characterised by a high
degree of secrecy and exceptionally low (often zero) rates of
corporate income taxation. Recently there has been increased
awareness of the growing proﬁt (or capital) share of GDP (Piketty,
2013). For the USA, the share of proﬁts in GDP increased from 5% in
2001 to 11% in 2012.2 Given this fact, it would appear that MNEs
are becoming increasingly adept at shifting their proﬁts to low tax
jurisdictions and thus eroding the corporate tax base.
The focus of this paper is, therefore, about uncovering and
measuring the ﬁrm and country-level factors that lead MNEs to
undertake tax haven activity. We conceptualise tax haven use by
amending the ﬁrm-speciﬁc advantage–country-speciﬁc advantage
(FSA–CSA) framework developed by Rugman (1981). This framework is then linked to Oxelheim, Randøy, and Stonehill’s (2001)
concept of ﬁnancial speciﬁc advantages and Hall and Soskice’s
(2001) varieties of capitalism (VOC). We also use a novel way of
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depicting ﬁrm-speciﬁc, home country-speciﬁc and host countryspeciﬁc advantages in this context and derive a number of key
hypotheses. We test our hypotheses by taking advantage of a large
panel dataset which includes 14,209 MNEs from 12 OECD
countries for the time period 2002–2010. The dataset allows us
to locate MNE subsidiaries around the world, including ones
located in tax havens, and this information is used to create a latent
measure of a ﬁrm’s likelihood to use tax havens.
Whereas past research has mainly focused on US ﬁrms (Desai,
Foley, & Hines, 2006a, 2006b), we build on the existing literature
by utilising an exhaustive and large-scale sample of MNEs. This is
possible due to the disaggregated and novel nature of data records
on subsidiary locations around the world, which has for a long time
been restricted by data availability. The recent World Investment
Report (UNCTAD, 2013) highlights the fact that investments into
offshore ﬁnancial centres are at historically high levels and that
they account for an increasing share of global FDI ﬂows. Moreover,
recent work by Beugelsdijk, Hennart, Slangen, and Smeets (2010)
has found that current measures of FDI stocks bias MNE afﬁliate
activity. Our analysis generates a number of fascinating insights
which we hope will kick-start a debate in the IB literature and
develop further analysis in this area.
Our ﬁrst, and arguably most important, result provides evidence
that MNEs located in different countries display systematic
differences in their strategies concerning tax haven use. Based on
the institutional framework of the varieties of capitalism (VOC) (Hall
& Soskice, 2001), which places the ﬁrm at the centre of the political
economy, we ﬁnd that MNEs classiﬁed as being located in liberal
market economies (LMEs) are more likely to undertake tax haven
activity compared with MNEs from coordinated market economies
(CMEs). By investigating tax haven use through the VOC perspective,
we are able to offer novel empirical support to the core VOC
argument that corporate ﬁnance and governance in CMEs are likely
to continue to exhibit substantial path-dependent institutional
differences from those found in LMEs, even in the context of ongoing
and rapid ﬁnancial globalisation in the 21st Century. This suggests
that international corporate tax reform is likely to be a slow and
drawn-out process due to conﬂicting political interests across
countries within different varieties of capitalism.
Our second result demonstrates that technology intensive
manufacturing MNEs with signiﬁcant levels of intangible assets
have a higher likelihood of owning subsidiaries in tax havens.
MNEs in service industries are, in general, also more likely to invest
in tax havens. This suggests that there are strong incentives for
high technology ﬁrms to transfer the ownership of their high value
intellectual property to tax havens in order to minimise taxation at
home, but also from abroad in non-tax haven subsidiaries.
Our third result shows that home country statutory corporate
tax rates have a small impact on tax haven use. In general,
corporate tax rates are an important factor in driving MNEs to set
up tax haven subsidiaries. However, as long as there is a signiﬁcant
gap between tax rates in OECD countries and those in tax havens,
our results suggests that reducing corporate tax rates will not
substantially change the likelihood of MNEs setting up tax havens
subsidiaries. MNEs will continue to take advantage of the host
country speciﬁc advantages available in tax haven locations, which
include minimal rates of corporate income tax, light-touch
regulation and secrecy.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. In the next section,
we provide an overview of the relevant theoretical framework and
develop hypotheses on the determinants of setting up tax haven
subsidiaries. The subsequent section describes the data, variables
and empirical model. The next section presents the results
followed by a discussion with respect to our conceptual framework
on FSA–CSA. We then conclude with avenues for future research in
this area that may impact upon the ﬁeld of IB.

2. Theoretical framework and hypotheses
A core part of an MNE’s successful ﬁnancial strategy is
concerned with its tax affairs and in particular its transfer pricing
activities (Eden, 2009). Transfer pricing allows an MNE to minimise
its corporate tax liability by setting appropriate prices for intraﬁrm trade and offers the ability to defer taxation into the future.
The use of tax havens can play a signiﬁcant part in this process by
allowing ﬁrms to use aggressive strategies for minimising tax
liabilities. Moreover, MNEs can take advantage of the light touch
regulation and secrecy that tax havens provide. Thus, tax haven
locations can be used by MNEs to exploit and create a competitive
advantage by arbitraging cross-country differences in the tax code
in order to reduce corporate funding costs, or the cost of capital, in
a manner not open to non-MNEs (Oxelheim et al., 1998).
The globalisation of IB activity has run in parallel with the
increasing growth in ﬁnancial market integration. Despite this,
however, the asymmetric incidence of accounting standards,
regulations and taxation has had signiﬁcant tactical and strategic
ﬁnancial implications for MNEs (Bowe, 2009). Dunning (1993)
conceptualises this in the form of an MNE possessing a ‘ﬁnancial
asset advantage’ in which ﬁrms can possess ‘superior knowledge
of, and access to, foreign sources of capital’. Nevertheless, Dunning
(2000) does not provide the speciﬁcs that need to be modelled into
the ‘ﬁnancial asset advantage’. For this reason, Oxelheim et al.
(2001) extend the Ownership-Location-Internalisation (OLI) paradigm (Dunning, 1977, 1988, 1995, 1998, 2000) by providing a
theoretical bridge with the international cost of capital literature
(Rajan & Zingales, 1998; Stulz, 1996). Their main proposition is
that an MNE’s ﬁnancial strength affects its ability to engage in FDI.
Oxelheim et al. (2001) distinguish between two types of
ﬁnancial strategy. Firstly, a proactive ﬁnancial strategy which is
aimed at reducing a ﬁrm’s cost of capital in order to maximise its
availability of capital both at home and abroad. Examples given
include the maintenance of a competitive credit rating, strategic
preparatory cross-listings and the competitive sourcing of capital
globally. The second type is a ﬁrm’s reactive ﬁnancial strategy in
response to ﬁnancial market imperfections. For example, ﬁrms
may be able to exploit undervalued or overvalued exchange rates,
react to capital controls that prevent the free movement of funds
and attempt to minimise taxation via the use of tax havens.
In the context of tax haven [2_TD$IF]FDI[3_TD$IF], we argue that the distinction
made by Oxelheim et al. (2001) is not appropriate because it is
based upon an arbitrary distinction between what is or is not
considered to be a market imperfection. Particularly when
extending the OLI framework, this distinction is at odds with
the key idea of OLI which is that the existence of MNEs is as a
response to imperfect markets (hence the need to internalise). One
could argue that all of the resources that ﬁrms devote to strategies
of ﬁnancial optimisation are made to deal with one type of market
imperfection or another. Indeed, if the ﬁnancial markets were
perfect, the ﬁnancing of MNE activities would essentially take care
of itself. For this reason by classifying the use of tax havens as a
reactive strategy, Oxelheim et al. (2001) dilute the impact that tax
minimisation may have.
Our view concerning FDI which is motivated for tax minimisation purposes differs from Oxelheim et al. (2001) re-active strategy
view. We argue instead that tax strategy is designed to overcome
market imperfections in the sense that MNEs can use experienced
tax experts to take advantage of so called hybrid mismatch
arrangements.3 These are opportunities available to ﬁrms to
exploit differences in the tax treatment of instruments, entities or
transfers between two or more countries. Very often these
3
We acknowledge that Hybrid Mismatch Arrangement can also be used between
non-tax haven countries.
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arrangements lead to ‘double non-taxation’ which allows MNEs to
avoid corporate income tax across locations.
In order to conceptualise the role that tax havens play in IB
activity one might be led to take a similar approach to that taken by
Oxelheim et al. (2001). In this sense, international expansion (i.e.
the use of tax haven subsidiaries) is based on the ability of MNEs to
leverage their own ﬁnance-related ownership (O), locational (L)
and internalisation (I) advantages. Nevertheless, as pointed out by
Rugman (2010) there is a close link between all three advantages
and thus the eclectic paradigm is arguably overdetermined. For
example, the ownership advantage (O) of a ﬁnancial blueprint to
avoid corporate income tax is strongly linked with it being
internalised (I) by the ﬁrm. In addition, the host country location
advantage (L) of a tax haven, i.e. low corporate taxes and secrecy,
can plausibly be transformed into an ownership advantage (O).
Rugman (2010) argues that the essence of the eclectic paradigm
is that the O, L, and I advantages all interact to produce a ‘‘coevolutionary’’ explanation of the patterns of overseas FDI at the
industry level. In contrast, internalisation theory is set at the ﬁrmlevel and focuses upon what Rugman (2010) terms the strategic
decision-making of the MNE. For this reason, internalisation theory
is useful in this context because it demonstrates the heterogeneity of
ﬁrm-level behaviour. This leads to the argument that the two key
determinants of FDI are ﬁrm-level factors, called ﬁrm-speciﬁc
advantages (FSAs) and country based factors, called country speciﬁc
advantages (CSAs). For this reason we adopt Rugman’s (1981) FSA–
CSA framework in order to model a ﬁrm’s strategy in relation to
setting up subsidiaries in tax havens. Not only is this approach useful
in highlighting the ﬁrm and country-speciﬁc factors that determine
tax haven FDI but it also lends itself to the ﬁrm level data we utilise.
Furthermore, in order to provide even greater clarity to this
framework, we use a novel way of distinguishing between home
country speciﬁc advantages and host country speciﬁc advantages.
2.1. Applying the FSA–CSA framework to tax haven use
Fig. 1 illustrates a 3-dimensional cube of Rugman’s (1981) FSA–
CSA matrix. There are now three axes: (1) the x axis shows FSAs
manifested in terms of high technology MNEs with large levels of
intangible assets; (2) the z axis shows home country-speciﬁc
advantages in terms of market orientation; and (3) the y axis shows
host country-speciﬁc advantages in terms of tax haven attractiveness. Most expositions of this model subsume home and host
country-speciﬁc advantages and thus the model is akin to a 2dimensional plane that labels CSAs on the vertical (y) axis and FSAs
on the horizontal (x) axis. Furthermore, Rugman (1981) distin[(Fig._1)TD$IG]guishes between ‘weak’ and ‘strong’ advantages but implicitly the

Fig. 1. FSA–CSA tax havens matrix.

239

advantages can be thought of on a continuous scale. Therefore, the
arrows extending out from the origin O1 in Fig. 1 represent
increasing advantage at the ﬁrm-speciﬁc, home country-speciﬁc and
the host country-speciﬁc levels. It is conceptually useful to envisage
ﬁrms positioned at various places in the cube and over time MNEs
evolving within it, due to changes in FSA/CSA advantages.
Firms that are positioned or are moving towards the origin O2
are more likely to be developing dynamic organisational capabilities (Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997), and maintaining effective
strategy. They are likely to be international in nature and taking
advantage of complex ﬁnancial structures, such as tax haven FDI, in
order to maintain competitive advantage. We now discuss each set
of the advantages in turn, within the context of tax haven FDI, and
develop a number of testable hypotheses. In the discussion section,
we comment on the strategic options available to MNEs in
reference to their positioning in the cube and how this position
may change over time.
2.2. FSAs
The mainstream resource based view (Barney, 1991) focuses on
FSAs which are commonly non-ﬁnancial in nature. The sources of
FSAs are usually embodied in proprietary knowledge in advanced
technology, patents and trademarks, advanced production techniques, entrepreneurial skills or economies of scale and scope. In
contrast, our focus here is on FSAs that give rise to ﬁnancial
ownership advantages.
In order to illustrate a ﬁnancial ownership advantage that gives
an MNE the ability to reap the rewards of making an investment in
a tax haven, it is useful to take advantage of what Oxelheim et al.
(2001) term a ‘ﬁnancial blueprint’. As in the case of patents, which
allow copyright protection for a period of time, an aggressive tax
avoidance strategy, which is unique to the ﬁrm, is likely to provide
advantages to the ﬁrm over its domestic and foreign rivals who do
not use tax havens. This could be obtained by hiring in-house tax
specialists and lawyers to create complex tax arrangements across
a ﬁrm’s global operations. The use of internal specialists, which
might be contracted via the leading accountancy ﬁrms, would
internalise this knowledge and help the MNE to efﬁciently escape
the exogenous market imperfections (Rugman, 1980) caused by
regulation – in this case corporate tax.
Such measures would come naturally to technologically intensive ﬁrms which possess large levels of intangible assets. It is well
known that MNEs prefer to transfer rights, patents, trademarks,
licences and sub-licences to low tax jurisdictions and thereby
receive payments for these ‘intangible assets’ from related companies in non-tax haven countries (OECD, 2013). Fig. 2 demonstrates
this using a simplistic tax structure involving a parent company and
two overseas subsidiaries, one of which is located in a tax haven. The
parent ﬁrm sub-licenses its intellectual property to the tax haven
subsidiary in a location with negligible levels of corporate income
tax. The tax haven subsidiary then sells the intellectual property to
the subsidiary located in the non-tax haven location at a high price,
allowing the ﬁrm to avoid corporate tax in that location by declaring
lower proﬁts due to higher costs. Not only therefore, does the MNE
avoid taxation at home but it is also able to avoid taxation abroad.
Clearly this simplistic structure has to be adapted in order to escape
the internal revenue services across the globe (see Mutti & Grubert,
2009). News reports of notable tax avoidance schemes such as the
‘Double Irish Arrangement’ and the ‘Dutch Sandwich’ are commonplace but are facing increasing scrutiny. At the same time, there is no
doubt that the ﬁnancial resources and expertise available to tax
specialists are far greater than the ability of treasuries to minimise
tax avoidance.
The existent literature in this area is certainly not silent. Sikka and
Willmott (2010) identify a number of interesting cases from across

[(Fig._2)TD$IG]
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Fig. 2. Tax haven and IP structure.

different types of industries where ﬁrms have taken advantage of
transfer pricing via the use of tax havens. Notable examples from
their study include the Enron affair of 2001, the collapse of
WorldCom in 2002 and other ﬁrms are identiﬁed in the pharmaceutical industry and the motor industry. Dyreng, Hanlon, and
Maydew (2008) construct measures of long run tax avoidance and
using univariate analysis ﬁnd that ﬁrms who spend more on R&D are
more likely to be high tax avoiders. Furthermore, Seabrooke and
Wigan (2014) highlight the unique way in which ﬁrms may value
intangible assets. They argue that this challenges the effectiveness of
the arms-length principle in transfer pricing. They go on to say that
ﬁrms can just redistribute intangible assets to holding companies
domiciled offshore in what they term ‘‘wealth chains’’. Therefore,
proﬁts can be shifted to jurisdictions where they are subject to little
or no tax. Interestingly, they argue that this problem may be
especially severe in digital distribution where ﬁrms from this sector
have signiﬁcant economic presence but pay little, if not zero, tax on
proﬁts.
In terms of the econometric evidence, Desai et al. (2006a) ﬁnd
that US companies with high R&D to sales ratios are more likely to
have tax haven subsidiaries. They conclude that the rising intensity
of MNEs and the growing volume of world trade between related
parties imply that the demand for tax haven operations is likely to
grow over time. Dischinger and Riedel (2011) using panel data on
European MNEs, ﬁnd that the lower the corporate tax rate in a
subsidiaries location, the higher the level of intangible assets.
Furthermore, Taylor, Richardson, and Taplin (2014) using data on
Australian ﬁrms ﬁnd that the level of intangible assets is a strong
determinant of tax haven utilisation. And lastly, Taylor, Richardson,
and Lanis (2015) ﬁnd that tax havens and the use of intangible assets
are important factors that assist ﬁrms in obtaining tax beneﬁts via
transfer pricing aggressiveness. We build on these single country
studies by exploiting a sample of MNEs from across the OECD. This
allows us to generate our ﬁrst hypothesis which links FSAs to tax
haven FDI:
H1. Technologically intensive manufacturing and services MNEs,
with high valued intangible assets, are more likely to own a tax
haven subsidiary compared with less-technologically intensive
MNEs.
2.3. Home country-speciﬁc advantages
It is not sufﬁcient for ﬁrms to have only FSAs if they are to make
use of tax haven subsidiaries. Country-speciﬁc advantages are also
of importance, particularly at the home country institutional level.
Many studies have already shown that ‘institutions matter’ in many
different settings (Gaur, Kumar, & Singh, 2014; Meyer & Thein,
2014). However, the main focus according to Jackson and Deeg
(2008) has been to relate certain institutional variables to particular
facets of business activity such as: how diverse regulatory rules and
legal norms affect MNEs (Brouthers, 2002); how politically related
hazards (conﬂict zones) impact on MNEs (Drifﬁeld, Jones, & Crotty,
2013; Henisz, Mansﬁeld, & Von Glinow, 2010); the role of property
rights (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1998); and the

role of distance between home and host economies (Beugelsdijk,
Slangen, & Hennart, 2011; Hofstede, 1980).
The above literature has tended to see MNEs as having to adapt
strategy to the institutional environment. In contrast, the literature
concerned with the VOC (Hall & Soskice, 2001; and later Hancke,
2009), whilst still adopting a ﬁrm-centric approach, views ﬁrms as
being socially embedded alongside other economic agents such as
individuals, producer groups and the government. Thus, ﬁrms are
seen as relational, seeking to create and exploit ‘core competencies’
(Prahalad & Hamel, 1990) or ‘dynamic capabilities’ (Teece, 2009)
for distributing goods and services in return for proﬁt. From this
perspective, differences in the institutional framework across
countries generate systematic differences in corporate strategy.
Indeed, this variation across countries is seen as giving ﬁrms a
distinct comparative institutional advantage. This is manifested in
terms of the key institutional complementarities – industrial
relations, vocational training and education, inter-ﬁrm relations,
corporate governance and agency relationships vis-à-vis employees. The relationship of these complementarities determines the
extent to which a political economy is, or is not, ‘coordinated’
(Hancke, 2009).
Hall and Soskice (2001) distinguish between LMEs and CMEs. In
LMEs such as Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom
and the US, ﬁrms operate in hierarchies and competitive markets
(Williamson, 1985). They are characterised by arms-length trading
in the context of competition and formal contracting and are
essentially centred on mobile ‘switchable assets’ whose value can
be realised when diverted to multiple activities. In contrast, in
CMEs such as Austria, Germany, Japan and the Nordic countries,
ﬁrms rely on non-market relationships that can be encapsulated
through informal and incomplete contracting, network collaboration and strategic interaction. The logic of a CME derives from what
Hall and Soskice (2001) and Hall and Gingerich (2009) deﬁne as
‘co-speciﬁc assets’.
VOC provides a ﬂexible framework for analysis and it seems
natural to adopt this institutional perspective when analysing the
home country-speciﬁc advantages of an MNE’s strategy to invest in
a tax haven. Indeed, Jackson and Deeg (2008) argue that this type of
approach is useful as it allows scholars to compare how ﬁrms in
different countries adjust to similar pressures in order to explore to
what extent institutional differences affect strategy.
As far as we know, there is no existent literature that
integrates the issue of tax haven FDI in to the VOC approach,
presenting a signiﬁcant conceptual gap which this paper ﬁlls. For
example, Weichenrieder and Mintz (2006) ﬁnd that in the case of
German outbound investment, holding companies in offshore
tax havens play a limited role in terms of third country conduit
structures. However, for US MNEs Lewellen and Robinson (2013)
identify the complexity of the foreign ownership structures in US
subsidiaries and ﬁnd signiﬁcant evidence of distinct tax motives
that highlight the divergence between ﬁnancial and real crossborder investments.
Much of the previous literature that has investigated tax haven
FDI has looked at it from an emerging markets perspective and
indicates that it is premised on institutional strength (Sharman,
2012; Stal & Cuervo-Cazurra, 2011). For example, Sutherland and
Matthews (2009) examine Chinese outward FDI into the Caribbean
tax havens and argue that ﬁrms engage in a form of ‘institutional
arbitrage’ whereby they exploit the superior institutions of foreign
markets. In this emerging market context, so called ‘roundtripping’ by Chinese MNEs is motivated by the weak domestic
regulatory framework that creates ‘barriers to trade, high taxes and
a lack of property rights protection’ (Xiao, 2004). Clearly,
institutional capacity in OECD countries exceeds that of emerging
markets, which means that this paper is concerned more with
institutional variation as opposed to institutional strength. Indeed,
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it is this institutional difference between countries where the
adoption of the VOC framework really illustrates its merits.
There are a number of potential reasons as to why MNEs located
in the LMEs are likely to have a greater propensity to utilise tax
haven subsidiaries compared with their CME counterparts. Many
of these factors are in many ways path-dependent and have
evolved over time. Indeed, our analysis will allow us to comment
on the future evolution of tax haven use in the context of ongoing
ﬁnancial integration. However, we must be clear at the outset that
our analysis does not seek to show that all LME MNEs use tax
havens or that all CME MNEs decide not to use tax havens. Instead,
we emphasise that LME MNEs have a greater likelihood of setting
up tax haven subsidiaries compared with their CME counterparts.
The ﬁrst factor that motivates why LME MNEs may be more
likely to use tax havens is linked to ﬁnancial risk. On the face of it,
one might be inclined to invoke the argument that MNEs from
LMEs are more likely to take a ‘short-termism’ approach in order to
maximise shareholder value. In this sense, MNEs would signiﬁcantly increase their debt levels in order to mitigate corporate tax
at home via deducting interest payments. At the same time, proﬁts
would be registered to the tax haven subsidiaries across the MNE
group therefore enhancing the value of the ﬁrm and potentially
creating a temporary boost in share price and creating a lucrative
impact on employee stock options. In contrast, MNEs from CMEs
are more likely to rely on long-term ﬁnance or what Deeg (2009)
terms ‘patient capital’. This means that MNEs from CMEs are more
likely to take a long run product-market strategy (Deeg, 2009) and
are thus less likely to want to take advantage of short-term taxavoidance schemes that might divert the attention of stakeholders
away from the ﬁrm’s core competencies (Dore, 2000). This will still
be the case even if the owners or shareholders are actually located
in LMEs. As the theory of VOC argues, ﬁrms choose locations based
on their own institutional comparative advantage so that any FDI
into either a LME or a CME is expected to adopt the so-called
‘norms’ associated with that ﬁrm’s institutional environment.
However, it is certainly feasible that LME ﬁrms may also adopt a
longer run perspective. LME MNEs are likely to be highly
innovative with potentially ground-breaking R&D projects. The
tax haven subsidiary may allow ﬁrms to build a vast ﬁnancial stock
of wealth in order to be able to shift capital rapidly across its
network. For example, many American high-technology ﬁrms tend
to be heavily insider-dominated (often by company founders) and
are managed with a very long term strategic perspective. Due to
this, there is some ambiguity concerning the short term versus the
long term nature of tax haven use. However, we argue this
distinction is worth mentioning, but to what extent this
explanation is more relevant to the following factors is still an
open question.
The second factor, which is strongly linked to the ﬁrst factor, is
that of corporate governance and in particular co-determination.
CMEs, notably Germany, have for decades enshrined the rights of
workers to be represented at the supervisory board level. This
suggests that instead of maximising shareholder value (as is the
ﬁduciary duty of LME MNEs) ﬁrms from CMEs are seen as
maximising the interests of a wider group of stakeholders. This
rests on the notion that the suppliers of equity capital and the
suppliers of labour manage the ﬁrm cooperatively (Gorton &
Schmid, 2004). For this reason, labour representation at the board
level may be ideologically opposed to tax haven use by ﬁrm
management. Moreover, large multi-industry unions would
presumably act more in the national interest rather than taking
a ﬁrm-level perspective. In this sense, tax havens may be seen to be
undermining industrial relations and the funding of collectivist
vocational training. Nevertheless, as Thelen and Busemeyer (2008)
argue, the German system of vocational training is currently
undergoing a ‘subtle but signiﬁcant change from a mainly
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collectivist system to a more segmentalist one’. This suggests that
as collective wage bargaining is eroded, MNEs may incrementally
become more like their LME counterparts and thus they may become
more open minded to the use of tax havens in the future.
The third factor is linked to economic geography (Buckley,
Sutherland, Voss, & El-Gohari, 2015; Haberly & Wójcik, 2014).
Haberly and Wójcik (2014) which shows that offshore FDI is
notably strong between current and former colonies. Not
surprisingly studies cite the United Kingdom as playing a
signiﬁcant role here. According to Palan, Murphy, and Chavagneux
(2010) seven out of the UKs fourteen overseas territories can be
regarded as tax havens: Bermuda, Cayman Islands, British Virgin
Islands, Gibraltar, Turks and Caicos, Anguilla and Montserrat. But
in addition to these locations, it is also important to consider the
Crown Dependencies of Jersey, Guernsey and the Isle of Man and
the former colony of Hong Kong. Palan et al. (2010) identify a
number of factors that led to this development. These include the
size of the British Empire and its central role in the industrial
revolution; the dominance of commercial and ﬁnancial elites
positioned in the City of London; the development of the
Euromarket in the 1950s; and ﬁnally the widespread use of
common versus civil law in the United Kingdom and across its
colonial outposts. Indeed, as Palan et al. (2010) remark, ‘the English
common law proved extremely useful in generating loopholes that
were used to develop tax havens’. Nevertheless, as with the other
factors described above there are also counter arguments.
Switzerland and the Netherlands, both CMEs, have a civil law
system and are arguably tax havens themselves. It is well known
that the latter is an attractive destination for some German MNEs.
Overall therefore, it is not our contention that MNEs from CMEs
do not use tax havens. Clearly our data demonstrates that a
proportion of them certainly do undertake this activity. However,
for the reasons outlined above it is our view that that they are likely
to use them to a lesser extent than their LME counterparts. This
leads to our second hypothesis:
H2. MNEs incorporated in Coordinated Market Economies have a
lower likelihood of investing in tax havens in contrast to MNEs
from Liberal Market Economies.
2.4. Host country-speciﬁc advantages
The host country speciﬁc advantages are perhaps the most
obvious from the point of view of MNEs investing in a tax haven.
One must assume that a major reason why an MNE would want to
set up a tax haven subsidiary is to mitigate taxation4 from their
country of origin and from other high-tax subsidiary locations, and
take advantage of the light touch regulation and secrecy that tax
havens provide. It is also conceivable that the use of tax haven
subsidiaries act as capital providers for the rest of the MNE group
(Altshuler & Grubert, 2003; Hines & Hubbard, 1990) or as captive
insurance companies to provide cover for risks not normally
insurable on-shore (Hampton & Christensen, 2002). The most wellknown tax havens, such as the Cayman Islands, Bermuda, British
Virgin Islands are all small island economies with low populations
and land masses below 23,000 km2 (see footnote 6). These
locations offer little in terms of natural resources and thus must
be viewed as advantageous because of their signiﬁcantly lower
rates of taxation and light-touch regulation on foreign income. In
addition, the locations of tax havens are often characterised as
having strong institutions and good governance to protect
investors (see Dharmapala & Hines, 2009).

4
We acknowledge that some MNEs will set-up operations in tax havens to
provide legitimate economic activities as opposed to tax avoidance.
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There is a large literature concerning the impact of taxation on
FDI (de Mooij & Ederveen, 2008; Hines, 1999). Indeed, the
consensus view is that the tax elasticity with respect to inward
FDI is approximately 0.6 (see Hines, 1999). Thus, a 1% cut in the tax
rate leads to an increase in the FDI stock of roughly 0.6%. In
contrast, our analysis is focused on outward FDI and the effect of
home country tax rates (or effective tax rates) on tax haven
propensity. Top statutory tax rates across the OECD all exceed 25%
(see Fig. A1 in Appendix) – signiﬁcantly higher than the near-zero
corporate tax rates levied by tax havens on corporate earnings.
Given this fact, tax haven locations must be incredibly appealing to
MNEs. Standard neo-classical economic theory would posit that
MNEs would evaluate the costs and beneﬁts of this type of activity.
Surely the tax differential between the home and host economy
(the tax haven) would weigh heavily? And presumably, as home
country corporate tax rates fall (as can be seen in Figs. A1 and A2 in
Appendix) tax haven activity should diminish. But the stylised
facts suggest that the use of tax havens is becoming increasingly
more frequent even as countries become more competitive over
their corporate tax rates (OECD, 2013). This indicates that the
impact of home country corporate tax rates seems small; implying
that MNEs are likely to use tax havens regardless of the home
country statutory rate and take signiﬁcant advantage of the strong
host country-speciﬁc advantages that tax havens can provide. This
leads to our ﬁnal testable hypothesis:
H3. The host country-speciﬁc advantages accessible in tax haven
locations minimises the impact of OECD corporate tax liberalisation
on the likelihood of an MNE owning a subsidiary in a tax haven.
3. Data, variables, and empirical model
This paper uses ORBIS which is a ﬁrm-level dataset provided by
Bureau van Dijk, a leading electronic publisher of annual accounts
information for ﬁrms across the whole globe. We use ﬁnancial data
for every MNE available in 12 OECD countries. We use the
conventional way of deﬁning an MNE, namely as a ﬁrm that owns
at least 10% in at least one subsidiary located abroad (OECD, 2013;
UNCTAD, 2013). However, it is important to mention that we do not
include ﬁrms as MNEs if their only subsidiary located abroad is in a
tax haven. The reason for excluding such ﬁrms from the analysis is
that establishing a tax haven presence is most likely an activity that
MNEs would embark on once they have achieved their MNE status
having undertaken FDI in non-tax havens subsidiaries.
One of the key advantages of using ORBIS is that it allows us to
identify the location of every MNE’s foreign subsidiaries, including
tax haven locations, which we use to construct our dependent
variable. The other advantage is that ownership of the MNE itself is
recorded in ORBIS and thus we are able to identify and track that
each MNE is ultimately owned by a majority shareholder that is of
the same nationality as the MNE home country (ORBIS terms these
as global ultimate owners). We use earlier releases of the dataset to
check that the ownership of the MNE is valid throughout the
sample period and no ownership change in terms of nationality has
taken place. Indeed the ownership detail in ORBIS is one area that
can address other fascinating questions, some of which we
mention in the discussion section. In total, we have 14,209 MNEs
over the time period 2002–2010, which results in an unbalanced
panel dataset of 64,476 observations.
A breakdown of the MNE’s country of origin is shown in Table 1.
In total there are 4512 MNEs from LMEs identiﬁed as Australia,
Canada, New Zealand, United Kingdom and United States. Of
the 2229 MNEs from the UK, 20.86% have a subsidiary in a ‘dot tax
haven’ (as deﬁned in the next sub-section). This compares with
56.56% in the US and 51.95% in Australia. It is clear from Table 1 that
MNEs incorporated in the CMEs identiﬁed as Austria, Germany,

Table 1
MNE parent country of origin.
Country

Number of
MNEs

Number
of MNEs
with dot
tax havens

Number of
MNEs with dot
tax havens
(% of country
sample)

2.34
0.44
0.24
15.69
13.04

173
18
10
465
1048

51.95
28.57
29.41
20.86
56.56

Coordinated market economies
Austria
979
6.89
Germany
3824
26.91
Japan
1079
7.59
Denmark
452
3.18
Finland
1221
8.59
Norway
578
4.07
Sweden
1564
11.01

81
367
214
91
84
75
276

8.27
9.60
19.83
20.13
6.88
12.98
17.65

2902

20.42

Liberal market economies
Australia
333
Canada
63
New Zealand
34
United kingdom
2229
United states
1853

Total

14,209

% of sample

100

Japan, Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden utilise tax haven
subsidiaries at signiﬁcantly lower rates. Of the 3824 German
MNEs, only 9.6% of them had a subsidiary in a ‘dot tax haven’. Indeed,
out of the CMEs, only Denmark has a ‘dot tax haven’ intensity
above 20%.
3.1. Dependent variable: classifying tax havens
The dependent variable TaxHavenFDIi is a binary variable which
equals 1 if an MNE has a subsidiary in a tax haven, and zero
otherwise. We acknowledge that in many ways the use of a dummy
variable is a limitation. Ideally it would be desirable to have a
variable that speciﬁcally measures the total assets invested in tax
haven subsidiaries. Although for some MNEs it is possible to obtain
this information in ORBIS, many of the tax haven subsidiaries
identiﬁed do not present information on total assets. This is most
likely due to the secrecy offered by tax haven locations.
Moreover, identifying the countries that can be considered tax
havens is not a trivial task. Palan et al. (2010: 8) devote a whole
chapter of their book Tax Havens: How Globalisation Really Works to
deﬁning them. They state that tax havens are:
‘‘places or countries that have sufﬁcient autonomy to write
their own tax, ﬁnance, and other laws and regulations. They all
take advantage of this autonomy to create legislation designed
to assist non-resident persons or corporations to avoid the
regulatory obligations imposed on them in the places where
those non-resident people or corporations undertake the
substance of their economic transaction.’’
Hence, the key characteristic is that tax havens have zero or
close to zero rates of taxation to non-resident companies. There are
a number of different lists available that classify countries as tax
havens. Hines and Rice (1994) and Desai et al. (2006b) distinguish
between what are known as ‘dot tax havens’ and the Big 7 (Hong
Kong, Ireland, Lebanon, Liberia, Panama, Singapore and
Switzerland). Dot tax havens are notably small island economies,
whilst the Big 7 had populations in 2013 exceeding 2 million. We,
therefore, take a conservative approach and adopt only the ‘‘dots’’
deﬁnition in order to construct our tax haven dummy variable.
The main reason is that many MNEs in our sample may have
subsidiaries in Switzerland and Hong Kong, which poses the
problem of distinguishing whether these subsidiaries add to real
economic activity or were created only for tax purposes. Our list,
therefore, includes the following countries: Andorra, Anguilla,
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Table 2
Descriptive statistics.
Variable

Obs

Mean

Std. dev.

Min

Max

Dot tax havens
Ln turnover
Ln intangible ﬁxed assets
Ln cash ﬂow
Ln long term debt
Age
Number of foreign subsidiaries
[1_TD$IF]Top corporate tax rate
Effective average tax
High technology manufacturing
Medium/high technology manufacturing
Medium/low technology manufacturing
Low technology manufacturing (base)
Knowledge intensive services
Less knowledge intensive services
VOC
VOC (Excl. Nordic)

64,476
64,476
64,476
64,476
64,476
64,476
64,476
64,476
64,476
64,476
64,476
64,476
64,476
64,476
64,476
64,476
49,172

0.2534
12.1574
8.4826
9.4828
9.6234
38.1881
53.3301
33.6411
29.1328
0.0781
0.1617
0.0842
0.1778
0.2793
0.2189
0.3445
0.4517

0.4350
2.2119
3.4179
2.4077
2.9614
38.235
133.999
5.8943
4.7522
0.2683
0.3682
0.2778
0.3086
0.4487
0.4135
0.4752
0.4977

0
0.1057
0.3687
0.3687
0.3159
1
1
25
21.2146
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

1
19.7278
18.9177
18.3566
19.5263
740
2471
40.9156
36.0387
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

Antigua, Barbados, Bahrain, Bermuda, Bahamas, Belize, British
Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Cook Islands, Cyprus, Isle of Man,
Jersey, Gibraltar, Grenada, Guernsey, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg,
Macao, Malta, Monaco, Netherlands Antilles, Saint Kitts and Nevis,
Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent, Seychelles and the Turks and Caicos
Islands.
It is important to note that the identiﬁcation of subsidiaries is
undertaken on the basis of when the ORBIS data are downloaded
(2012). This does not pose a problem because ORBIS identiﬁes the
whole history of subsidiary ownership for each MNE. There are
very few circumstances where an MNE opens or shuts a tax haven
subsidiary during the period of investigation. Nevertheless, this
means that our dependent variable is contemporaneous for each
MNE throughout the sample. In our context, the dependent
variable offers a proxy for the overall likelihood of MNEs to conduct
this activity. It is rare that MNEs shut tax haven subsidiaries and for
MNEs that are operating in multiple tax haven locations, our
dummy variable is still valid as long as MNEs consistently have at
least one subsidiary located in a tax haven. We are therefore
conﬁdent, that for the purposes of this paper, our methodology
adequately justiﬁes the measure of tax havens we use.5
3.2. Explanatory variables
We use annual accounts data for each MNE comprising of
turnover6 to capture MNE size, cash ﬂow, intangible ﬁxed assets,
long term debt, the number of foreign subsidiaries and ﬁrm age.
For detailed descriptions of each of our variables see Table A1 (see
Appendix). All monetary values are deﬂated using GDP deﬂators to
take account of inﬂation. No ﬁnancial information about the
subsidiaries is utilised in our analysis (apart from location), as
these data are often unavailable. Thus, we only focus on the parent
ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial data and the location of each MNE’s foreign
subsidiaries, which are sufﬁcient for testing our hypotheses.
We obtain data on the top rate of corporation tax and the
effective tax rate at the country level from the Oxford Centre for
Business Taxation. Figs. A1 and A2 plot each of these tax rate
variables for the OECD countries in our sample (see Appendix). It is
not surprising that the effective tax rate (for the calculation of this
variable see Bilicka & Devereux, 2012) is lower than the top

5
This means it is not feasible to estimate a meaningful random effects probit
model as only a handful of MNEs would experience a change over time in the tax
haven dummy independent variable. We have estimated cross section models
separately for each year and the results do not alter. This again justiﬁes our use of a
pooled panel. By pooling we increase the precision of the estimates.
6
We exclude proﬁtability as it is highly correlated with sales and endogenous.

corporate tax rate. The US has the highest statutory rate at
approximately 40% and this does not change throughout the period
of investigation (likewise the rate for Austria, Japan and Norway).
Nevertheless, upon close inspection of the data, it is clear that
countries are becoming more competitive over tax rates. For all of
the countries, excluding the US and Japan, the effective tax rates
fell over the period of investigation.
We distinguish between different sectors by using NACE twodigit industry codes. We use broad categories as deﬁned by
Eurostat: high technology manufacturing, medium high-technology manufacturing, medium low-technology manufacturing, low
technology manufacturing, knowledge-intensive services, and
less-knowledge intensive services.
Table 2 offers descriptive statistics for each of the variables used
in the following analysis. Included are the mean, standard
deviation and the maximum and minimum values for each
variable. In terms of observations, 25.3% of the sample consists
of MNEs that have at least one subsidiary in a ‘dot tax haven’. The
average age of an MNE in our sample is around 38 years with a
similar standard deviation which suggests that there is a wide
variation in ﬁrm age. The top corporate tax rate faced by MNEs at
home is on average 33.6%, with an average effective tax rate of
29.1%. The sample is almost split evenly between manufacturing
and services MNEs. Table A2 (see Appendix) contains the
correlation matrix for each variable and as can be seen suggests
no multicollinearity issues.
3.3. Deﬁning market orientation
The choice as to whether a country is classiﬁed as a LME versus
a CME has some arbitrariness to it. Is Italy a coordinated market
economy? What about Switzerland? Indeed, Switzerland may be
considered a tax haven. In order to overcome this difﬁculty we
adopt the empirical analysis of Hall and Gingerich (2009) who
construct two indices based on labour relations and corporate
governance and then estimate a regression model between the
two. On their plot, the upward sloping regression line reﬂects the
degree to which countries can be classiﬁed as coordinated. They
argue that there is a clear clustering pattern between nations, such
that LMEs can be found in the southwest quadrant and CMEs can
be found in the northeast quadrant. Among the nations included,
the US and the UK appear as ‘pure’ LMEs, whilst Canada, New
Zealand, Ireland and Australia diverge ‘‘by virtue of systems of
corporate governance in which market co-ordination is not fully
developed’’ (Hall & Gingerich, 2009, p. 459). In contrast, Austria,
Germany, Japan, Denmark, Finland and Norway lie above the line
of best ﬁt (Sweden lies just slightly below), indicating ‘‘high levels
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of strategic co-ordination in both their labour and ﬁnancial markets’’
(Hall & Gingerich, 2009, p. 459). The authors identify four nations
(Spain, Portugal, France and Italy) as interesting cases because they
lie below the regression line. Indeed, they point out that there is
much controversy as to whether these southern European nations
really can be classiﬁed as coordinated in the VOC sense.
Due to the ambiguity outlined above, we take a conservative
approach when deﬁning which countries to include in our sample.
It seems quite clear that Australia, Canada, New Zealand, United
Kingdom and the United States can be classiﬁed as LMEs. Thus,
MNEs that are incorporated in these countries are coded with a 1 in
our data. We do not include MNEs from Ireland as many analysts
regard it as a tax haven in itself. In order to deﬁne CMEs, we start
by including only Germany, Austria and Japan and code MNEs
incorporated in these countries with a zero. This means our ﬁrst
dummy variable measures the extreme cases and results in a sample
consisting of 49,172 observations. As a robustness check, we
subsequently re-deﬁne the dummy variable to include Nordic MNEs
(Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden) as being from CMEs and
this increases the size of the data set to 64,476 observations.

Table 3
Dot tax haven results (marginal effects).
Variables/speciﬁcation

(1)
Dot tax
havens

(2)
Dot tax
havens

(3)
Dot tax
havens

Ln turnover

0.00498
(0.00608)
0.0280***
(0.00298)
0.0300***
(0.00463)
0.00496**
(0.00243)
0.000444***
(0.000164)
0.00180***
(0.000247)
0.00617***
(0.00125)

0.00614
(0.00486)
0.0271***
(0.00234)
0.0270***
(0.00371)
0.00117
(0.00204)
0.000254*
(0.000139)
0.00183***
(0.000234)
0.00106
(0.000958)

0.00616
(0.00485)
0.0271***
(0.00234)
0.0271***
(0.00371)
0.00117
(0.00204)
0.000254*
(0.000139)
0.00182***
(0.000234)

Ln intangible ﬁxed assets
Ln cash ﬂow
Ln long term debt
Age
Number of foreign
subsidiaries
Top corporate tax rate
Country effective
average tax rate
VOC

0.149***
(0.0113)

0.00136
(0.00118)
0.150***
(0.0113)

High technology
manufacturing dummy
Medium/high technology
manufacturing dummy
Medium/low technology
manufacturing dummy
Knowledge intensive
services dummy
Less knowledge intensive
services dummy

0.223***
(0.0138)
0.189***
(0.0271)
0.0999***
(0.0219)
0.0318
(0.0264)
0.0618***
(0.0203)
0.0280
(0.0209)

0.188***
(0.0240)
0.0854***
(0.0184)
0.0333
(0.0222)
0.0591***
(0.0164)
0.0163
(0.0169)

0.188***
(0.0240)
0.0854***
(0.0184)
0.0332
(0.0222)
0.0588***
(0.0164)
0.0163
(0.0169)

Year dummies
Observations
Pseudo R2
Correct predictions

Yes
49,172
0.3498
82.97%

Yes
64,476
0.3353
83.97%

Yes
64,476
0.3353
83.97%

VOC (Excl. Nordic)

3.4. Empirical model
We estimate a probit model that is developed from the standard
ﬁrm-level FDI literature that seeks to construct a speciﬁcation from
IB theory. This is discussed at length in a number of review articles,
in economics and regional science, as well as IB and strategy (see
e.g. Bhaumik, Drifﬁeld, & Pal, 2010; Drifﬁeld & Munday, 2000;
Girma, 2002; Wiersema & Bowen, 2008). The models we estimate
are variants of the following speciﬁcation:
TaxHavenFDIi ¼ b0 þ

6
X

5
X

k¼1

s¼1

bk FSAkit þ

þ d0 Taxit þ lt þ eit

fs Sectorsi þ l0 VOC i
(1)

where the dependent variable TaxHavenFDIi equals 1 if a MNE has a
subsidiary located in a dot tax haven and equals zero otherwise.
The vector FSAkit captures a number of ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics
which are seen as important in previous research, such as ﬁrm size
measured by turnover (e.g. Graham & Tucker, 2006), cash ﬂow,
intangible ﬁxed assets, long term debt, ﬁrm age and the number of
foreign subsidiaries as a measure of the extent of an MNE’s
internationalisation activities and experience. The vector Sectorsi
includes sector speciﬁc dummy variables at the two-digit NACE
level, based on the Eurostat deﬁnitions as discussed above and the
base category is set as low technology manufacturing. The variable
VOC is a dummy variable that equals 1 if an MNE is incorporated in
a LME and zero if an MNE is incorporated in a CME. Again we have
two measures for this variable with one of them excluding the
Nordic countries. The variable Tax is a measure of the corporate tax
rate levied in an MNE’s country of origin. Here we use two
measures: (1) the top corporate rate and (2) the country effective
tax rate. Finally, lt are time dummies to account for business cycle
effects and eit is the error term.
4. Empirical results
We estimate 3 speciﬁcations of Eq. (1) and the results are
presented in Table 3. To summarise: speciﬁcation (1) includes the
VOC dummy (excluding the Nordic countries) and the top
corporate tax rate, speciﬁcation (2) includes the VOC dummy
(including the Nordic countries) and the top corporate tax rate, and
speciﬁcation (3) includes the VOC dummy (including the Nordic
countries) and the effective country rate of corporate tax. The
results reported are the marginal effects and we also include the
Pseudo R2 and the number of correct predictions as measures of ﬁt.

Note: Industries are grouped into technology intensive sectors as classiﬁed by
Eurostat. The low technology manufacturing sector is used as the reference
category with which the other industry dummies are compared with. All monetary
values are in thousands of US dollars and are deﬂated using GDP deﬂators. Clustered
standard errors at the MNE level.
*
p < 0.1.
**
p < 0.05.
***
p < 0.01.

Overall, the results show conclusive support for each of our
hypotheses. Hypothesis 1 states that technologically intensive
manufacturing services MNEs with high valued intangible assets
are more likely to own tax haven subsidiaries compared with lowtechnology MNEs. This is essentially a hypothesis that investigates FSAs. As can be seen in speciﬁcations (1)–(3) intangible
assets has a positive and signiﬁcant impact on the likelihood of tax
haven presence. The coefﬁcient across each speciﬁcation is in the
range of 0.027–0.028 which as an elasticity means that a 10%
increase in intangible assets increases the likelihood of tax haven
presence by around 2.7–2.8%. In addition, the sector speciﬁc
dummy variable coefﬁcients rank in order of technological
intensity. The reference category here is low technology
manufacturing. As can clearly be seen across all three speciﬁcations, the variables ‘‘high technology manufacturing ﬁrms’’ and
‘‘knowledge intensive services ﬁrms’’ both have positive and
signiﬁcant coefﬁcient estimates compared with the other low
technology categories. Indeed the ‘‘medium technology
manufacturing ﬁrms’’ and the ‘‘less knowledge intensive services
ﬁrms’’ have insigniﬁcant estimates. These results offer support to
the fact that high technology ﬁrms have a higher likelihood to
transfer the ownership of their high value-added intellectual
property to these locations in order to minimise taxation at home
and from abroad in non-tax haven subsidiaries.
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We now turn to the results that investigate home country
speciﬁc advantage as motivated by the VOC framework. There is
clear support for the second hypothesis that MNEs incorporated in
CMEs have a lower likelihood of investing in tax havens in contrast
to MNEs from LME. The coefﬁcient estimate for the VOC dummy
that excludes Nordic MNEs (column 1) suggests that MNEs from
the liberal markets of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, United
Kingdom and United States have approximately a 22.3% higher
likelihood of a tax haven subsidiary compared with their CME
counterparts in Austria, Japan and Germany. This estimate reduces
to approximately 15% when the Nordic countries are included in
the data as can be seen in columns (2) and (3). The results justify
the use of the VOC approach (Hall & Soskice, 2001; Hancke, 2009)
to explain why ﬁrms from particular countries vary in terms of tax
haven presence. It is clear that home country CSAs are thus
incredibly important, even more so when we only include the
extreme countries identiﬁed in the VOC approach.
Finally, we analyse host country speciﬁc advantage and ﬁnd
support for Hypothesis 3. The host country-speciﬁc advantages
offered by tax havens appear to minimise the impact that corporate
income tax rates (levied at home) have on the likelihood of an MNE
owning a subsidiary in a tax haven. The coefﬁcient estimate for the
top rate of corporate tax in speciﬁcation (1) is positive and
signiﬁcant. This gives the impression that higher tax rates at home
drive MNEs abroad. But the size of the estimate is notably small and
in reality MNEs are concerned more with the effective corporate tax
rate they actually have to pay. As can be seen, when the Nordic
countries are included in the sample, the coefﬁcient for the top rate is
negative and insigniﬁcant in speciﬁcation (2) and likewise for the
effective country corporate tax rate in speciﬁcation (3). It would
appear therefore, that the impact of corporate tax rates, holding
everything else constant, has a minimal impact on the tax haven
decision. Regardless of the corporate tax rate, MNEs will do this
activity as the host country speciﬁc advantage of zero tax rates and
high degrees of secrecy in tax havens prove incredibly attractive.
Clearly this has a number of policy ramiﬁcations which we will
discuss in more detail in the conclusion.
Notwithstanding the variables that give evidence to our
hypotheses it is also important to discuss the control variables.
The
[(Fig._3)TD$IG] estimates for MNE size are not as expected. The literature
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consistently ﬁnds evidence that larger US ﬁrms are more likely to
have a propensity to use tax haven subsidiaries (see Graham &
Tucker, 2006) but our results provide statistically insigniﬁcant
estimates. This in itself is very interesting, as it suggests that
smaller MNEs may be as adept as larger MNEs at minimising
corporate tax. Nevertheless, by including a variable that measures
the number of foreign subsidiaries, as a measure of the extent of an
MNE’s internationalisation activities and experience, the results
indicate that the more international the MNE is, the greater the
likelihood of utilising tax haven subsidiaries. Additional insights
also suggest that MNEs with larger cash ﬂow and lower long term
debt are also more likely to undertake this type of activity.
5. Discussion
5.1. Strategic options open to the MNE: positioning within the cube
Our portrayal of Rugman’s (1981) FSA–CSA matrix in the form
of a cube allows us to provide a useful insight into which types of
ﬁrms are more likely to invest in tax haven subsidiaries (Fig. 3).
MNEs positioned on the diagonal arrow close to the origin O2
will be utilising tax haven subsidiaries. These MNEs are combining
their FSAs (e.g. intangible assets, patents, R&D, etc.) with home and
host country-speciﬁc advantages. Our results conﬁrm that these
MNEs are from countries with a strong LME orientation such as
Australia, Canada, New Zealand, United Kingdom and the United
States. They will be transferring (or registering) the ownership of
their patents and trademarks to tax haven subsidiaries located in
countries with negligible corporate tax rates, high levels of secrecy
and signiﬁcant institutional strength that favour the protection of
private property rights (i.e. strong host country-speciﬁc advantages). Classic examples of these types of ﬁrms include Amazon,
Google and Starbucks.
MNEs located or moving towards the origin O4 are generally
ﬁrms with strong FSAs in customisation and marketing and are
basically following some sort of differentiation strategy. These ﬁrms,
although having the potential to utilise tax haven subsidiaries, are
less likely to do so because their country of incorporation is located
in a CME. Our results conﬁrm this – MNEs from Austria, Germany,
Japan and the Nordic countries are less likely to utilise tax haven

Fig. 3. FSA–CSA matrix results summary.
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subsidiaries. Thus, the home country institutional context is of
increasing importance and may deter ﬁrms from utilising complex
ﬁnancial structures linked to tax avoidance.
MNEs located close to or at origin O3 will be globally orientated,
producing commodity type products. They may well be entering
the later stage of the product life cycle and although they may be
from LMEs they will have less reliance on utilising complex
ﬁnancial structures. Interestingly, for those MNEs moving away
from this origin towards O2 (i.e. those ﬁrms that are improving
their FSAs), we predict that they will begin to use tax haven
subsidiaries with increasing frequency. This is consistent with the
ﬁnding that technologically intensive manufacturing and services
ﬁrms are prone to this type of investment. Indeed, if world GDP is
to be driven by these types of ﬁrms we predict that tax haven use
will become even more pronounced in the future unless policy
makers take action.
Finally, MNEs located near the origin O1 will be domestically
based small and medium-sized enterprises with limited global
exposure. Although they may be close to engaging in international
markets (via exports), ﬁrms in this segment may be less efﬁcient
and possess neither a consistent strategy, nor any intrinsic CSAs or
FSAs. If ﬁrms positioned at this part of the cube are not able to
transform their corporate strategy to escape this segment they are
likely to lose competitive advantage over time, notably to MNEs
with tax haven presence. From a strategy perspective, it is not
surprising that ﬁrms in this segment would shy away from
focusing on complex tax structures. Instead they should focus their
activities on their core competencies – building FSA to create
sustainable competitive advantage. Nevertheless, if these advantages can be built, ﬁrms may begin to consider creating more
complex ﬁnancial structures that take advantage of tax minimisation in order to compete at a global level
Consequently, our results support our conjecture that the
combination of strong and increasing home and host CSAs in
addition to strong and increasing FSAs leads to sustainable
competitive advantage, compelling ﬁrms to have an international
presence and to take advantage of complex ﬁnancial structures in
tax haven locations.
6. Conclusion
There is no doubt that globalisation has increased the spread
and mobility of MNEs (Eden, 2009). This paper is the ﬁrst that
investigates the determinants of MNEs investing in tax havens,
using a large scale ﬁrm-level dataset that covers 12 OECD
economies. It is clear that governments across the OECD fear
the role that tax havens may play in eroding the corporate tax base.
Given this, it is perhaps not surprising that tax rates have fallen
signiﬁcantly in OECD countries over the last decade (Figs. A1 and
A2, see Appendix). Tax competition across countries and the
lowering of domestic tax rates has certainly had a competitive
effect in attracting foreign inward investment, ceteris paribus.
However, our results suggest that tax competition between states
is unlikely to deter MNEs from using tax haven subsidiaries so long
as a large gap in corporate tax rates persists. Consequently, it is
perhaps not surprising to ﬁnd that international policy coordination across the OECD has focused more on sharing information via
Tax Information Exchange Agreements compared with broader tax
liberalisation measures (see Braun & Weichenrieder, 2015).
Furthermore, our results indicate that the utilisation of tax
haven subsidiaries is likely to become even more widespread in the
future. We ﬁnd that MNEs from the high technology manufacturing and services sectors with high levels of intangible assets are
more likely to have tax haven presence. This has signiﬁcant
implications for the OECD corporate tax base if future growth in the
world economy is to be driven by high technology MNEs. Policy

makers, assuming they are not captured by political interests, are
likely to become even more sceptical of this type of activity. This
may lead to some kind of reform in the international system of
corporate taxation. However, it remains to be seen whether reform
will be shaped by governments in favour of MNEs or by imposing
taxation on less mobile income.
Finally, our results are suggestive of signiﬁcant heterogeneity
across countries. MNEs from LMEs are signiﬁcantly more likely to
undertake tax haven FDI compared with MNEs from CMEs. This
result is the ﬁrst of its kind to link tax haven use to the theoretical
perspective of the VOC. This ﬁnding lends novel empirical support
to the core VOC argument that corporate ﬁnance and governance in
CMEs exhibit substantial path-dependent institutional differences
even in the context of ongoing ﬁnancial integration. This suggests
that international policy reform may come under increasing strain
as politicians seek to represent the comparative institutional
advantage of the polity they represent. In this sense, LME policy
makers may take a more liberal attitude to the use of tax havens by
MNEs compared with their CME counterparts.
Whilst the focus of this paper is on the determinants of tax haven
use, it also has important implications in terms of the measurement
of FDI. In this regard, our ﬁrm-level evidence of divergent tax haven
use across countries and MNEs adds a further dimension to the
argument made by Beugelsdijk et al. (2010) and Sutherland and
Matthews (2009) with respect to biases in the measurement of
aggregate FDI. Currently, FDI stock and ﬂow statistics include the
ﬁrst destination, not the ultimate destination. Thus, cases of outward
FDI returning back home, aka ‘‘round-tripping’’ and FDI that passes
through tax havens to another foreign country is not uncommon, but
still regarded as ‘‘genuine’’ FDI. This is an important problem in
knowing where the investment has actually come from and where it
is ﬁnally put to productive use. This inevitably leads to biased results
in any future studies using FDI data to analyse any empirical FDI
issue, unless it controls for tax haven activity. Therefore, the
reliability in using FDI data becomes potentially a greater problem
for countries where the incidence of tax haven use is more
pronounced. A similar argument can be made for ﬁrms in countries
that have a higher share of intangible assets/high technology ﬁrms.
Indeed, recent work by UNCTAD (2013) shows the distorting impact
of FDI to tax havens when measuring MNE activity using aggregate
FDI data. Moreover, there are efforts by the OECD and IMF to exclude
FDI ﬂows that are either destined or pass through tax havens, in
order to capture ‘‘conventional’’ FDI.
Although our paper is the ﬁrst of its kind to investigate tax haven
use by MNEs across OECD countries using a large ﬁrm level data set,
our analysis has three general limitations which future research may
be able to address in order to shed additional light on the use of tax
havens subsidiaries. First of all, our dependent variable is fairly
restrictive in the sense that it does not speciﬁcally measure the
ﬁnancial extent to which MNEs have a presence in tax havens.
Although Orbis data does provide some limited ﬁnancial information on the value of assets located in tax havens its coverage is
inadequate. Future studies could address this weakness by obtaining
more detailed data across OECD countries. Secondly, more
information on subsidiary activity is needed in order to isolate
whether tax haven activity is actually used for productive economic
activity or just tax minimisation, especially in countries such as
Switzerland and Ireland. This would allow broader measures of tax
haven use to be adopted with greater conﬁdence in the reliability of
the data. Thirdly, our analysis does not capture dynamic effects. It
would be fascinating to discover the extent to which ﬁrms increase
or decrease their likelihood of using of tax havens as government
policy at home or abroad changes. Last, but not least, extending the
analysis beyond OECD countries is important and our ﬁndings may
only reﬂect broad trends in the developed world. For example, the
relationship between country level institutional characteristics and
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tax haven use in emerging market economies would be a fruitful
avenue for future research. Theoretically the relationship between
institutional quality and tax haven use can either be argued to be
positive (i.e. high institutional quality leads to more tax haven use,
due to for example the sophistication of home country ﬁnancial
market intermediation/tax advisory services) or negative as
identiﬁed by the existing literature in relation to emerging market
MNEs (e.g. the capital ﬂight argument).
Indeed, future IB research is needed in this area to determine
whether different forms of corporate governance, both at the ﬁrm
and country level, dictate the use of tax havens. This will help in
bridging our understanding of this complex phenomenon from the
perspectives of IB, ﬁnance and corporate governance. There are a
number of fascinating questions that the current IB literature can
address in order to be at the forefront on this important debate. For
example, what is the role of ownership structure? Do MNEs with,
for example, a more opaque structure have a greater likelihood of
tax haven use? Have MNEs with different ownership nationalities
in a certain home country different propensities of investing in tax
havens? Does management and board composition play a role? Do
family owned ﬁrms engage in this activity to a greater or lesser
degree than non-family owned ﬁrms (see Chen, Chen, Cheng, &
Shevlin, 2010)? Do state owned ﬁrms take part in this type of
activity in emerging markets? Finally, it is unknown whether and
to what extent the use of tax havens increases ﬁrm performance?
In particular, would any performance gains be captured purely in
terms of proﬁtability or would ﬁrm level productivity be affected at
all? Indeed, does the level of proﬁtability differ between LME MNEs
and CME MNEs? It is hoped that this paper introduces a new line of
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enquiry to be opened up in the IB literature given the widespread
use of tax havens by MNEs.
Managerial relevance
The corporate tax landscape is under much scrutiny due to the
state of the public ﬁnances in OECD countries. This may have
signiﬁcant implications for MNEs across countries in the future.
This research sheds light on the types of ﬁrms that make use of tax
havens in their international business operations and offers a
number of conclusions that are relevant for future policy.
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Fig. A1. Top corporate tax rates by country.
Source: Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation.
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Fig. A2. Effective average corporate tax rate by country.
Source: Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation.

Table A1
Deﬁnition of variables.
Variable name
Firm characteristics
Turnover

Age
Cash ﬂow
Intangible ﬁxed assets
Long term debt

Number of foreign subsidiaries
Industry characteristics
High technology manufacturing
Medium/high technology manufacturing
Medium/low technology manufacturing
Low technology manufacturing
Knowledge intensive services
Less knowledge intensive services
Tax haven deﬁnitions
Dot tax havens

Description

Source

(Turnover) is listed in the Balance Sheet account and deﬁned as Total Operating Revenue (Net
sales + Other operating revenue + Stock variations). These ﬁgures do not include VAT or excise taxes
or similar obligatory payments.
The age of a ﬁrm calculated since the year the company was incorporated.
Cash ﬂow is deﬁned in the proﬁt and loss account as the sum of:
P/L for Period [=Net Income] + Depreciation.
All intangible assets such as formation expenses, research expenses, goodwill, development
expenses and all other expenses with a long term effect.
Long term debt is a ﬁnancial variable in the balance sheet account and is deﬁned as loans and
ﬁnancial obligations owed for a period exceeding 12 months. This can include bank loans, mortgage
bonds, debentures or other obligations not due for 12 months.
The total number of foreign subsidiaries identiﬁed for the parent ﬁrm.

ORBIS

Nace 2-digit codes: 21 and 26
Nace 2-digit codes: 20, 27, 28, 29, 30
Nace 2-digit codes: 19, 22, 23, 24, 25, 33
Nace 2-digit codes: 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 31, 32
Nace 2-digit codes: 50, 51, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 78, 80, 84, 85, 86,
87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93
Nace 2-digit codes: 45, 46, 47, 49, 52, 53, 55, 56, 68, 77, 79, 81, 82, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99

Andorra, Anguilla, Antigua, Barbados, Bahrain, Bermuda, Bahamas, Belize, British Virgin Islands,
Cayman Islands, Cook Islands, Cyprus, Isle of Man, Jersey, Gibraltar, Grenada, Guernsey,
Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Macao, Malta, Monaco, Netherlands Antilles, Saint Kitts and Nevis,
Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent, Seychelles and the Turks and Caicos Islands

ORBIS
ORBIS
ORBIS
ORBIS

ORBIS

Eurostat
Eurostat
Eurostat
Eurostat
Eurostat
Eurostat

ORBIS
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Table A1 (Continued )
Variable name
Tax variables
Top corporate tax rate

Country effective average tax rate

Market orientation and institutions
VOC (Excl. Nordic)

Description

Source

This is obtained from a number of sources including the Ernst & Young Worldwide Corporate Tax
Guide; IBFD Tax Research Platform; IBFD Global Corporate Tax Handbook; European Tax Handbook;
ZEW Intermediate Report; Deloitte Tax Highlights and International Tax and Business Guide; KPMG
Tax Rate Survey; and the PKF Worldwide Tax Guide.
See Bilicka and Devereux (2012). CBT Corporate Tax Ranking 2012 for the methodology used to
calculate effective average country tax rates.

Oxford Centre
for Business
Taxation

Equals 1 if an MNE is incorporated in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, United Kingdom or United
States and 0 if an MNE is incorporated in Austria, Germany or Japan.
Equals 1 if an MNE is incorporated in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom or the
United States and 0 if an MNE is incorporated in Austria, Germany, Japan, Denmark, Finland, Norway
or Sweden.

VOC

Oxford Centre
for Business
Taxation

ORBIS
ORBIS

Table A2
Correlation matrix for selected variables.

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11

Variable

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

Dot tax havens
Ln turnover
Ln intangible ﬁxed assets
Ln cash ﬂow
Ln long term debt
Age
Number of foreign subsidiaries
Top corporate tax rate
Effective average tax
VOC
VOC (Excl. Nordic)

1
0.4271
0.4864
0.4554
0.3957
0.1278
0.4466
0.1502
0.1729
0.3211
0.3378

1
0.7571
0.8943
0.7366
0.3403
0.4661
0.4064
0.417
0.2363
0.1271

1
0.7663
0.6801
0.176
0.4571
0.274
0.3093
0.4508
0.4463

1
0.7403
0.3052
0.4775
0.3611
0.3797
0.2822
0.2018

1
0.2294
0.4408
0.3274
0.3417
0.2422
0.1744

1
0.1587
0.212
0.2102
0.08
0.17

1
0.0965
0.1061
0.1695
0.1513

1
0.9371
0.1192
0.177

1
0.1874
0.055

1

11

1

Note: Correlations are calculated based on the full sample of 64,476 observations except for the liberal vs. coordinated (Excl. Nordic) dummy variable which is calculated on
the sample with 49,172 observations.
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